com.originalpictures.tmk-pdqf.1

Identity

Pinned artefacts

Every file the runtime loads or builds from is pinned by SHA-256; a file with any other hash is refused.

How the fingerprint is computed

Frames are sampled at 15 fps and 64 x 64 pixels; each gets a PDQF frame feature, and the Temporal Match Kernel combines them into one whole-clip descriptor with a 256-dimension level-1 vector. ThreatExchange's tmk tools at baefb4ed, built from source, with their default configuration.

How matching works

A candidate matches when both the level-1 and the level-2 scores are at least 0.70, ThreatExchange's default thresholds. A fingerprint is compared only with fingerprints of the same algorithm, calibration and threshold, within the account that signed the file. Whole-clip temporal match; robust to re-encoding; a 10% border crop breaks it.

What a positive result means

A match means the file looks or sounds like a file the signer's account signed, closely enough to pass the threshold above. It points to that file's C2PA manifest, which declares its origin. It is a probabilistic lead, not cryptographic proof: a fingerprint matches similar content, can miss heavily edited copies, and says nothing about whether the content is true. The signed manifest, where it survives, is the proof.

Measured performance

Original Pictures' 2026 fingerprint benchmark measured this fingerprint at a different threshold from the one production matches at, so no figure is published for the production rule.

The value a soft-binding assertion would carry

• Value: The TMK+PDQF feature file the ThreatExchange tools write, as base64: the bytes Original Pictures stores, about 260 KB before base64 on the benchmark corpus.
• Scope: The whole clip.
• Encoding note: The C2PA schema defines a soft-binding value as a byte string. Original Pictures' signing engine writes it as text, as it already does for the ISCC binding, so the form above is the text a manifest would carry.
• Emission: Planned after the identifier is assigned, subject to the value size.

How to check a file

• Content Credentials. Any C2PA-aware validator can read and check the manifest of a file that still carries one, without calling Original Pictures.
• The fingerprint. Fingerprint recovery runs inside a verification: POST /v1/verifications on the Original Pictures API. When no manifest can be read, the verification compares the file's fingerprints with the recorded ones and reports a single match as recovery-only (VALIDATION_RECOVERY_ONLY), never as cryptographic validity; several plausible matches fail closed as ambiguous. Recovery searches only the bindings of the account that runs the verification. See lookup and recovery and fingerprints.
• There is no public soft-binding resolution API. A hosted verify page does not check MP4 video today, so a third party cannot run this fingerprint through one. Otherwise, contact the signer or us.
• Comparing values yourself. TMK+PDQF is public, so once the value is in a manifest anyone can build the ThreatExchange tools at the same commit, compute a candidate's descriptor and score the pair.

Relation to C2PA

When a fingerprint algorithm has an identifier on the C2PA soft-binding algorithm list, the manifest can carry a c2pa.soft-binding assertion that names it in its alg field. Registration for com.originalpictures.tmk-pdqf.1 has been requested with the C2PA soft binding algorithm list; no identifier has been assigned yet. Until one is, and until Original Pictures ships the change that writes it, no manifest names this fingerprint: it is a server-side recovery signal only. Today the one fingerprint a manifest carries is ISCC Image-Code (io.iscc.v0). This page is the entry's informational URL.

Status and contact

• Status: registration requested with the C2PA soft binding algorithm list.
• Contact: hello@originalpictures.com
• Last updated: 2026-11-08. The values on this page are generated from the production registry.
• All Original Pictures soft-binding algorithms